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Introduction 
 
Teaching at a four-year university with no graduate program in philosophy, I often struggle 
with enrollment in the upper-division courses that I teach on a regular basis: metaphysics, 
philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of time, and senior seminars on 
related topics. My department has 100–150 majors, but my analytic courses sometimes 
face the threat of cancelation due to insufficient enrollment. Most of our majors flock to 
the many courses we offer in the continental tradition and to social/political philosophy 
courses such as Philosophy of Race and Gender or Philosophy of Sex and Love. Some of 
our majors could complete the program without ever taking any course in the analytic 
tradition. It seems that many philosophy undergraduates shy away from dipping into the 
“hard-core” analytic philosophy courses. Students perceive analytic philosophy to be 
“hard”; and more importantly, they find it too abstract, too nit-picking, too technical, and 
ultimately having no relevance to their lives or their concerns. I teach at a state university 
in southern California, where many students are working minimally 20–30 hours a week 
to support their studies. Some of them are first-generation college students, and they don’t 
have the luxury of engaging in abstract philosophical discourse with their peers or among 
family members. Many of them are uncertain about their future, about their job prospects, 
and about themselves. What could analytic philosophy offer them? How could analytic 
philosophers speak to them?  
The alienation between analytic philosophy and the current college student body is not 
a reflection of the demise of student intellect or the incompetence of instructors, but the 
current state of analytic philosophy. To begin with, finding the right readings for my 
students in these analytic courses has always been a challenge. I assign primary texts, as I 
believe that the best way to enhance students’ philosophical literacy is to have them learn 
directly from philosophers. However, many articles written by contemporary analytic 
philosophers are obsessed with reformulation of principles, outrageous counterexamples, 
and some even with excessive symbolization. At the end of plodding through a long, 
tedious and technical paper, I often found myself going through a loop just to come back 
to where I started. If the long analysis could bring me closer to understanding the issue, the 
effort put into reading is well worth it. However, it is often the case that at the end of the 
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paper the author simply reaches a formulation that he or she found to be satisfactory—until 
the next person comes around to challenge it. I cannot expect my students to be enlightened 
by reading these articles other than learning to see how these analytic philosophers play 
their skill of philosophical analysis to the extreme.  
Another challenge for teaching metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of 
language in the analytic tradition is that some recent issues seem to be contrived and jargon-
laden. There are too many counterexamples that are trite and ridiculous, and too many “-
isms” or principles introduced just to be refuted. For example, in philosophy of mind, the 
notion supervenience was at the center of the mind-body problem for a while, and then 
various definitions of ‘supervenience’—strong, weak, local, global supervenience and 
even “superdupervenience”—were introduced. The rampant discussion on the 
conceivability of zombies and its associated problems such as whether conceivability 
entails possibility does not seem to lead to anything substantive. How do we motivate 
students to engage in a serious discussion on whether zombies are conceivable and 
therefore possible? In philosophy of language, all is well before the introduction of possible 
world semantics. Then suddenly we are dealing with primary intensions, secondary 
intensions, epistemic intensions, epistemic possible worlds, scenarios, etc. How do I expect 
my students, who already have a hard time grasping the notion of a priority, to appreciate 
the significance of making these distinctions? In contemporary metaphysics, concepts such 
as simples, gunk, junk, trope, perdurance, endurance, coincidence, fission, fusion, etc., all 
require advanced training and knowledge, and it is not easy to prepare my students to get 
excited about these topics when the upper-division metaphysics course may have been the 
first (and possibly the last) course in analytic philosophy that they take before graduation. 
I do want my students to think about the “big and hard” questions in Mind, Language and 
Metaphysic, but I also want to have an honest assessment of what they could walk away 
with from these courses.  
If philosophy majors in a four-year state university will have difficulty reading analytic 
philosophical papers and being engaged in the contemporary philosophical discourse, then 
those outside the discipline, including intellectuals in other disciplines in the humanities, 
are not going to have an easier time either. Many contemporary analytic philosophers seem 
to have forgotten their readers’ receptivity and intellectual interests when they write. This 
is no surprise, since they are writing for their peers, for the scores of people who are 
engaged in the same language game. They are trapped in their own circle of analytic 
philosopher compatriots and forget how to reach out to others, to motivate others to think 
with them. 
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The Narrowing Circle of Experts with Analytic Philosophical Issues 
 
As a philosophical trend, analytic philosophy in the Anglo-American tradition is primarily 
a “problem-solving activity.”2 From the beginning, analytic philosophy “aims to solve 
particular problems, puzzles and paradoxes, and to build theories in answer to them. It 
prefers to work upon details and particular analyses, rather than to produce general 
syntheses.”3 However, the collective “problem-solving activities” within analytic 
philosophy are primarily performed by the specialists, and for the specialists, on those 
particular philosophical problems. As Neil Levy points out, “The analytic philosopher 
addresses specialists she knows will share her technical vocabulary and her sense of what 
problems she ought to be concerned with.”4 As a result, many of the papers published in 
peer-reviewed journals and further selected in standard anthologies are intelligible only to 
a small number of experts. Even analytic philosophers with the same area of specialization 
would find themselves becoming novices with issues that others have developed into a 
theoretical labyrinth, not to mention analytic philosophers working in other areas. This 
“clubbishness” within analytic philosophy creates nepotism and exclusionism that 
professionals and students alike become outsiders. According to Alexander Nehamas, 
“This has led to what I believe is a dangerous fragmentation in the field, with people who 
teach together in the same department having neither any idea of what their colleagues are 
doing nor any interest in ever finding out.”5 
At the same time, partly due to the time and rigor required to keep up with an ongoing 
philosophical discourse, but partly also due to the closed-mindedness of some analytic 
philosophers, any philosophical tradition or issue that is not in the “main stream” analytic 
philosophical circle is regarded with disinterest, apathy, or even scorn. Many contemporary 
analytic philosophers know very little beyond their own expertise, and their philosophical 
engagement is restricted only with those in their clique. Analytic philosophy isolates itself 
from the history of Western philosophy as well as histories of other philosophical traditions. 
According to Hilary Putnam, a feature of Anglo-American analytic philosophy is “the 
exclusion of ‘continental philosophy,” and he remarks, “This indifference of analytic 
philosophy departments to what interests the other humanities departments is not surprising, 
however, when one realizes that the self-image of analytic philosophy is scientific rather 
than humanistic.”6 Nehamas also reports that by the late 1940s, analytic philosophers 
“ceased to think of themselves as part of the enterprise to which their colleagues in 
literature and history departments were devoted; they started thinking of themselves instead 
as participants in the enterprise of science.”7 In addition to segregating itself from the rest 
of the humanities, analytic philosophy also “retreated from the public domain. It no longer 
saw itself as bearing a direct relation to the world.” Once analytic philosophy uproots itself 
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from the humanities and humanistic concerns, it also stops being relevant. Analytic 
philosophy stands opposed to “generalism,” but as a result it also risks falling into 
provincialism.  
Of course, all disciplines aim to develop expertise and their development depends on 
the interchange among specialists in the field. I am not suggesting that top analytic 
philosophical works have to be watered down to suit the general public. However, I do 
think that some contemporary analytic philosophers are self-indulgent when they write long 
formalistic papers that do not touch on real issues. They don’t seem to care whether their 
examples could motivate readers to think, or whether their conclusions could really “solve” 
a problem. As Neil Levy presents the accusation that others have made of analytic 
philosophy: Analytic philosophy “is a new scholasticism, where the concern for technique 
overwhelms the very problems that the techniques had originally been designed to solve.”8 
The intellectual rigor that defines analytic philosophy should not be translated into arid 
formulation after formulation of the same position. One rule that analytic philosophers 
should adhere to, but often do not, is the methodology of analytic philosophy—
philosophical analysis that aims to clarify in a concise manner. According to James Baillie, 
“The idea of analytic philosophy clearly rests on some notion of analysis. Analysis consists 
of breaking down a complex system into its component parts, thereby making the 
underlying elements and the relations between them explicit […]. The aim of philosophical 
analysis was to become clear about what was being said or thought.”9 What analytic 
philosophers criticize about the continental philosophical style—obscure, convoluted 
rhetoric and vacuous verbiage—should be used as a mirror on their own writings.  
In the current academic environment in the U.S., those universities with a graduate 
program in philosophy and those without seem to be of two cultures. According to the 
Philosophical Gourmet Report 2011 by Brian Leiter, “In the U.S., all the Ivy League 
universities, all the leading state research universities, all the University of California 
campuses, most of the top liberal arts colleges, most of the flagship campuses of the 
second-tier state research universities boast philosophy departments that overwhelmingly 
self-identify as “analytic”: it is hard to imagine a “movement” that is more academically 
and professionally entrenched than analytic philosophy.”10 This may be true for the 
research universities and top liberal arts colleges; however, many, if not most, 
undergraduate programs elsewhere strive to be diversified and pluralistic, and analytic 
philosophy has a difficult time attracting students when it is not the only tradition offered. 
Graduate programs train future philosophy instructors to be immersed in the analytic 
philosophical discourse and writing style, but these graduate students would need to 
readjust their expectation when they begin teaching undergraduate students who are 
encountering analytic philosophy for the first time.  
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In four-year universities, philosophy courses are often offered as general education 
courses to non-majors, and many undergraduate students are drawn to philosophy courses 
because they found them interesting, thought-provoking, eye-opening and even life-
changing. Analytic philosophy is not a natural enemy to these students. They can learn to 
appreciate abstract speculation and meticulous philosophical analysis, but they also need 
to see the point. To stimulate these young minds and to inspire them to think outside the 
box, analytic philosophy needs to go back to the basics and restore the charm of analytic 
philosophy when substance takes precedence over form, and problem-solving activities 
aim at genuine philosophical problems rather than fabricated linguistic trivialities. There 
are numerous exciting topics that undergraduates could be fully engaged in because these 
topics “concern” them—not in the daily pragmatic sense, but on the deeper level of their 
own existence. 
 
Back to the Basics: Investigation of the Nature of Language and Reality  
 
In its heyday,11 analytic philosophy provided perspectives that challenged us to reflect on 
the nature of language and its relation to reality. Early analytic philosophers seemed to be 
more immersed in the history of Western philosophy, and their philosophical concerns 
reached far beyond the trifles of linguistic analysis. They made a point. Even if their 
writings are by no means easier to read, it is a rewarding experience in the end. The key to 
the future development of analytic philosophy, then, is to reestablish the link to general 
philosophical problems, to return to the questions that would make people reexamine their 
common assumptions about the nature of reality, and to find ways to draw in undergraduate 
students.  
In my Philosophy of Mind class, for example, students are eager to learn about the 
various contemporary theories on the mind-brain relationship, and although many of them 
came into this course with a Cartesian dualist mindset, most would end up defending a 
form of functionalism, reductive physicalism, or non-reductive physicalism. The issues of 
qualia and consciousness are especially engrossing for my students, and they would read 
things outside of reading assignments to be better acquainted with the ongoing discussion. 
The Turing Test and whether robots could have intelligence, thought, and emotions are of 
course the most fascinating topic for my students. From reflecting on the possibility of 
artificial intelligence, they also begin to examine the nature of mind or mental state.  
In Philosophy of Language, I select primarily earlier articles by Frege, Russell, 
Wittgenstein, Austin, Searle, Quine, Davidson, Donnellan, Putnam, and Kripke. Frege’s 
“Sense and Reference” and the ensuing debate between description theories and direct 
reference theories constitute the core of my syllabus. The aim is to make students think 
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about the following questions: What is the nature and function of language? What do we 
mean when we speak—is meaning determined primarily by our intentions or by what our 
words express? How do our words refer to objects in the world? How is the use of proper 
names established in our language? What is the connection between language and the 
world? How does language depict reality? What is the connection between thought and 
speech? Is private language possible? How is communication accomplished? How do we 
ascribe beliefs to others when we are using our words to capture what they have in mind? 
Among these topics, Wittgenstein’s ideas about language game and private language, 
Quine’s idea of radical translation, and Davidson’s theory of intersubjective interpretation 
generally draw appreciative nods from my students.  
In Philosophy of Time, I probe such questions as: Is time real or unreal? Does time exist 
on its own or is it merely a reflection of relations among things? Does time “flow” and is 
there a “passage of time”? What constitutes “the present”? Are the past and the future real? 
Is there a single timeline progressing as an arrow or are there multiple timelines in space? 
Is time travel possible conceptually, metaphysically or physically? Could there be a “causal 
loop” such that one goes back in time to cause things to happen for the present? However, 
I have to admit that other than McTaggart’s challenging but rewarding article on time and 
David Lewis’ fun article on time travel, I have had a hard time choosing the right articles 
for this course. Most anthologies of philosophy of time include highly sophisticated and 
technical articles that are not intended for newcomers. Some articles with intriguing titles 
end up doing more sophistry than touching on the enigma of time itself.  
Finally, in Metaphysics, I begin with the debate between realism and anti-realism, and 
ask students to ponder these questions: What is “reality”? Do we really know the reality? 
Is reality simply what we perceive, or is it what we as humans have created together? Is 
human science advancing toward reality, or are we simply shifting from one scientific 
paradigm to another? Is what we call ‘reality’ constructed out of humans’ conceptual 
schemes? What is truth? How can ‘truth’ be defined? Putnam’s version of realism and his 
challenge of the fact/value dichotomy generally make students examine their own 
conception of reality, and Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking is both shocking and 
enlightening to my students. Once students loosen their grip on reality, they begin to 
entertain a variety of metaphysical positions.  
Good philosophy makes people think hard because it poses good questions. For analytic 
philosophers to produce good analytic philosophy, they must remember the primary goal 
of philosophy: to challenge people to think. Philosophical analysis is a tool, and we should 
not simply stare at the finger and forget the moon to which the finger points.  
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Engaging Analytic Philosophy with Chinese Philosophy 
 
On a personal level, I have been reconstructing Chinese philosophy with the analytic 
methodology for years. Analytic philosophy and Chinese philosophy are not as incongruent 
as is commonly believed by philosophers on both sides. There are mutual benefits to gain 
if we engage Chinese philosophy with analytic philosophy: on the side of Chinese 
philosophy, we could employ a language of clarity and lucidity gleaned from analytic 
philosophy; on the side of analytic philosophy, we could broaden our perspectives of key 
philosophical issues prominent in the tradition of analytic philosophy.  
To engage Chinese philosophy with analytic philosophy is not to presume that the two 
traditions are naturally compatible. For one thing, the Daoist and the Buddhist traditions 
have always emphasized that one should go beyond linguistic expressions, to seek 
transcendent truth, to grasp the meaning behind words and to comprehend the teacher’s 
sayings with one’s intuitive understanding. This is why some people strongly oppose using 
the analytic methodology on Chinese philosophy.12 Eske Møllgaard argues that the analytic 
philosophical treatment of Chinese philosophy “hampers productive research in this 
area.”13 Bernard Faure argues that analytic philosophy “falls under the fascination of a 
particular kind of purely linguistic approach” and “restricting philosophy to grammar.”14 
However, the development of Chinese philosophy has a lot to gain from importing analytic 
philosophical methodology and issues into traditional Chinese philosophy. As mentioned 
before, the methodology of analytic philosophy is philosophical analysis—focusing on the 
clarification of philosophical concepts, the articulation of reasoning and argumentation, 
and the precise formulation of principles or definitions. This methodology of philosophical 
analysis is very useful in the study of Chinese philosophy, especially for the benefit of 
contemporary readers. Contemporary interpreters of ancient Chinese philosophical texts 
should aim to assist readers in their understanding, and the precise choice of words along 
with the clear formulation of views is an effective means. Granted, the analytic presentation 
of Chinese philosophy cannot exhaust the whole content of Chinese philosophy, but it is a 
start in the right direction. What analytic philosophy as a methodology can offer to Chinese 
philosophy, is the scholars’ conscious efforts aiming at conceptual clarity and precision of 
language. The analytic reconstruction of Chinese philosophy can help connect 
contemporary readers with these traditional philosophical issues. For example, the debate 
on realism and anti-realism is reflected in the Daoist conception of language and reality; 
the conviction of moral realism is implicit in the Confucian moral philosophy. There are 
many others who have engaged analytic philosophical issues or positions with classical 
Chinese philosophy—virtue ethics, moral psychology, political philosophy, and 
metaphysics are at present the most prominent areas of comparative study.   
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At the same time, analytic philosophical tradition challenges every participant to be a 
problem solver, a thesis presenter, and most importantly, to establish his or her own view. 
Expository work and textual analysis take backstage to the introduction of a novel solution. 
Any budding analytic philosopher is entitled to challenge the received view, as long as he 
or she has done the groundwork of research and has truly come up with something that can 
add to the discussion. It is this kind of equality that facilitates an open exchange of ideas 
in the circle of analytic philosophy. The historical tradition of Chinese philosophy, on the 
other hand, takes the pattern of adhering to one’s own philosophical school, which is 
marked by the hierarchy of one master and multiple students. Ancient texts are often 
students’ records of the master’s teachings of the classics. This long-held “awe” toward the 
masters and the classics dominated the intellectual culture of interpretation and 
reinterpretation, to the extent that even one’s novel ideas were disguised as textual 
commentary (as seen in the works of Neo-Confucians). To engage Chinese philosophy 
with analytic philosophy, therefore, one needs to begin with an attitude shift: from “textual 
interpretation” to “problem-solving,” from speculating on the original author’s intent to 
developing one’s own voice. The convergence between analytic philosophy and Chinese 
philosophy can take place at various junctures with some aim at lucidity of conceptual 
analysis and rigor in philosophical argumentation, while some others go for innovative 
problem-solving as a joint endeavor. 
Both philosophical analysis as a methodology and analytic philosophy as a 
philosophical interlocutor can contribute to the development of Chinese philosophy. The 
conceptual clarity gleaned from analytic philosophy can enable Chinese philosophers to 
better express their viewpoints. Analytic philosophy can also suggest many new topics and 
problems for the development of Chinese philosophy. Chinese philosophy, as well as other 
Asian philosophies, needs to be “reinvented” in order to become part of the global 
philosophical exchange. The analytic approach provides one way to philosophize Chinese 
thought, so that the question whether there is philosophy in Chinese history will no longer 
be pertinent.  
 
Conclusion: Putting Analytic Philosophy Back in the Humanities 
 
In my opinion, if analytic philosophy is to be a philosophical tradition that can make a 
cultural contribution to the world in the twenty-first century, then it needs to come out of 
the ivory tower—the graduate programs that teach exclusively analytic philosophy. 
Analytic philosophers should not think that their profession is only for the analytic elites, 
that their writings are only meant for trained experts, and that their serious philosophical 
pursuits are naturally urgent and important to others. They need to rethink the value of their 
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projects and find believable examples to motivate them. If analytic philosophy cannot even 
reach out to undergraduate students who receive proper instruction from their professors, 
then it will hardly have any appeal to other intellectuals in our society. As Putnam puts it, 
“Good prose, whatever its subject, must communicate something worth communicating to 
a sensitive reader […]. The demand that we only say what can be said in the sort of prose 
that Bertrand Russell wrote, marvelous as that prose was, will, in fact, necessarily limit 
what one can talk about.”15 Nehamas also points out that “[analytic] philosophy needs to 
take seriously the need to communicate its concerns more broadly and to a larger 
audience.”16 Accessibility and relevance must be constant reminders when analytic 
philosophers write their prose.  
Furthermore, analytic philosophers need to have a broader philosophical training, so 
that their discourse makes more connections with other philosophical issues. Back in 1959, 
C. P. Snow criticized “the cultural divide” of the times: those in the culture of sciences and 
the culture of humanities “can’t talk to each other,”17 and he writes: “this polarization is a 
sheer loss to us all.”18 Now even within the philosophy circle, there is still the persistent 
polarization between analytic philosophy and any other philosophy that is supposedly non-
analytic—continental philosophy, Asian philosophy, to list just the obvious. Analytic 
philosophy needs to open its closed door, and analytic philosophers ought to become more 
informed of philosophical issues and traditions that are not born and bred in the analytic 
tradition per se. Current graduate students in analytic programs need to be more broadly 
educated in the history of Western philosophy as well as in more pluralistic philosophical 
traditions to make connections with other philosophical concerns. Analytic philosophy 
needs to be brought out of its exclusionist clique and present its philosophical findings in 
a way accessible to a broader readership. It should return to genuine human concerns and 
resituate itself in the humanistic departments. I share Putnam’s sentiment when he writes, 
“I am concerned about certain tendencies in analytic philosophy—by the tendency to 
scientism, the tendency to patronize the history of philosophy, the refusal to hear other 
sorts of philosophy—but fighting these tendencies is not the same thing as fighting analytic 
philosophy.”19 I believe that analytic philosophy has a lot to offer to our undergraduates, 
to the future intelligentsia of our society, but it needs to change its self-image first.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. I wish to thank my colleague Andrew Howat for his input. 
2. Levy 2003, 293. 
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3. Engel 1999, 222. 
4. Levy 2003, 296. 
5. Nehamas 1997, 221. 
6. Putnam 1997, 201. 
7. Nehamas 1997, 212. 
8. Levy 2003, 286. 
9. Baillie 2003, ix. 
10. Leiter 2011. 
11. By this I refer to what Alexander Nehamas calls the “canon” of analytic philosophy: 
works by Frege, Russell, Carnap, Ayer, Ryle, Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, 
Quine, Davidson, Putnam, and Kripke. The list is of course not exhaustive. 
12. For example, Eske Møllgaard argues that the analytic approach “reduces unique 
thought to arguments and subsumes the specific under abstract categories.” Hence, 
“in the study of Chinese thought this philosophy must be rejected” (2005, 321). 
Bernard Faure calls professional analytic philosophy “a language game in and of 
itself,” which imposes a “straightjacket” on our understanding of reality (2004, 33). 
A Chinese scholar Fang Chaohui also criticizes the approach of analytic Chinese 
philosophy: “Employing Western disciplinary categories to interpret Confucian 
classics would turn Confucianism onto the path of being epistemized and 
philosophized.” (Fang 2007, 12, my translation)  
13. Møllgaard 2005, 321. 
14. Faure 2004, 31. 
15. Putnam 1997, 201–2. 
16. Nehamas 1997, 222. 
17. Snow 1961, 17. 
18. Snow 1961, 12. 
19. Putnam 1997, 202. 
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